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Introduction
The question if and how taxes affect stock prices is a central aspect for firm valuation, tax planning and tax policy that has been frequently discussed (e.g. Blouin, Raedy, and Shackelford, 2002; Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson, 2003; Dhaliwal, Li, and Trezevant, 2003) . While the literature provides evidence that anticipated capital gains taxes will be reflected in the asset price (e.g. Günther and Willenborg, 1999 ; for a review see Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010) , corresponding studies are generally based on the theory of market efficiency implying an immediate response of investors to new relevant information. Thus, the focus of the empirical literature is on announcement effects of tax law changes (Lang and Shackelford, 2000; Dai, Maydew, Shackelford, and Zhang, 2008; Blouin, Hail, and Yetman, 2009 ). However, as research on tax salience suggests, tax effects on decision-making are not only driven by tax burdens and tax planning opportunities, but also by tax information and tax awareness of individual decision-makers (Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009; Finkelstein, 2009; Edgerton, 2012; Alstadsaeter and Jacob, 2013) . Corresponding results suggest that private investors, even if they have heard about an upcoming tax reform, may not optimally consider taxes by reason of tax unawareness and procrastination behavior. Regarding the capitalization of taxes in asset prices, these findings raise some doubt about the optimal decision-making of private investors and the efficiency of financial markets in processing tax-relevant information.
Combining both strands of literature, we argue that the capitalization of capital gains taxes in asset prices does not only depend on tax rates and assessment bases, but also on the tax awareness of market participants and especially private investors with limited tax knowledge. Furthermore, as tax awareness cannot be regarded as constant over time, the capitalization of capital gains taxes (and likewise other forms of taxation) may not only be driven by announcement dates of upcoming tax reforms but also by the relevance of tax issues in the media affecting the degree of tax awareness in a society. Hence, it may be insufficient to focus exclusively on announcement dates of tax reforms to identify tax effects on asset pricing.
We refer to a recent major reform of German capital gains taxes in order to address these issues empirically. Before the reform, capital gains on private shareholdings were generally tax-exempt if the holding period exceeded one year. In May and in July 2007 the German federal parliament and the German federal council concluded a business tax reform including a capital gains tax with a flat rate of 26.38 % (25 % income tax plus solidarity tax surcharge) on all private shareholdings acquired after December 31, 2008. Therefore, the reform generated a strong incentive for private investors to buy shares before its introduction date of the reform on January 1, 2009. Note that the taxation of well-informed institutional investors was not affected by this reform.
Assuming fully tax-aware investors and taking into account the long interval between the official announcement of the reform (July 2007) and its introduction (January 2009), market reactions should have been focused on the announcement date, while the corresponding introduction date should have been anticipated by the market. However, as documented by market research of Deutsche Bank (2008) and the largest German market research institute GfK (GfK, 2008; Hilmes, 2008) during the last months 2008, the majority of German private investors was either unaware or not fully aware about the capital gains tax reform.
In December 2008, the subject became a major issue of public debate and was strongly discussed by the media. Therefore, we expect that private investors did not only focus on the announcement date of the German capital gains tax reform but also on its introduction date resulting in a strong impact on trading volumes and share prices by the end of 2008. There are two theoretical justifications for this hypothesis. First of all, the vivid public debate on the capital gains tax reform in December 2008 'alarmed' private investors resulting in higher tax awareness.
Second, evidence from the psychological and financial literature suggests that private decision-makers tend to procrastinate savings and portfolio decisions up to the final possible decision moment (Akerlof, 1991; Ferrari and Dovidio, 2000; Ferrari and Hammer, 2002; Thaler and Bernartzi, 2004) .
In our empirical analysis, we test for abnormal trading volumes, asset prices and daily returns of all stocks listed on the German stock market at the turn of the year 2008/2009. We do not consider announcement effects of the tax reform, which are hard to isolate and have already been investigated by Voeller and Müller (2011) . 1 Using difference-in-differences estimation, we find evidence for a temporarily strong increase in trading volumes and asset prices.
Controlling for end-of-the-year effects, the average trading volume in the last two trading days 2008 exceeded the regular volume by 160 %. In addition, investors paid an asset price surcharge of about 7.4 % in these days. On the contrary, we observe negative abnormal trading volumes and daily returns in the week following the turn-of-the-year 2008/2009. Thus, our research suggests shifting of share trades from 2009 to 2008 in order to avoid tax payments.
Our findings have important implications for tax policy and research. We are the first to argue and to show empirically that the capitalization of taxes in stock prices and trading volumes can be significantly affected by tax awareness. Thus, it may be insufficient to focus exclusively on announcement dates of tax reforms in order to identify the effect of tax law changes on asset pricing. If a significant fraction of investors will not be aware about the announcement date of a corresponding tax reform, such estimates may understate the true tax effect on asset pricing. In addition, tax policy might take use of such a behavior in order to avoid unwanted price and trading fluctuations.
Second, our paper highlights limitations of capital markets in processing tax-relevant information. As shown for the case of Germany, the announcement of a certain event may be ignored for a considerable time by a large fraction of market participants. Thus, unawareness and procrastination seem to be not only an issue for savings behavior and retirement annuities (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Carroll et al., 2009 ), but also for private shareholders. However, as the time to react expires, the awareness of the market increases, which may result in herd behavior and higher market volatility.
Third, our analysis points to opportunities for well-informed and tax-aware investors to generate tax arbitrage profits. If delayed market reactions close to introduction dates of tax reforms might be anticipated, an optimal strategy would be to sell shares exactly before the introduction date and to rebuy these shares about one week thereafter. Note that our regressions imply an unexpected average increase in share prices of about 7.4 % in the last 1 Note that the capital gains tax reform 2009 was part of a broader reform package (German business tax reform 2008/2009). As these regulations were jointly announced and approved by the German legislator (see Section 2), an empirical identification of the isolated announcement of the German capital gains tax reform 2009 should be a hard task. However, that does not hold for the introduction date, as all other relevant reform measures of the business tax reform 2008/2009 were already introduced by January 2008 and not in January 2009 (like the capital gains tax reform). two trading days 2008, and that institutional investors were not affected by higher capital gains taxation. Thus, institutional investors might have benefited significantly from the reform.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief overview of the German capital gains tax reform 2009 and the more comprehensive business tax reform 2008/2009. Section 3 develops theory and derives our hypotheses. Section 4 provides the identification strategy and the data. Section 5 reports and discusses our results. Section 6 concludes.
The German capital gains tax reform 2009
The introduction of the new German capital gains tax 2009 was embedded in the more general 
Theory and hypotheses
Corresponding to Lang and Shackelford (2000) , the current share price 0 P of an asset can be modelled as a function of constant free cash flows F , the shareholder distribution of the following period (with a constant growth rate in future periods) 1 D , the dividend tax rate d  , the capital gains tax rate c  and the discount rate r 5
(1)
While this model is based on the assumption of market efficiency, it does not account for behavioural aspects like the degree of tax awareness. Gamage and Shanske (2011) define the concept of tax awareness as "(…) any systematic differences between how taxpayers would perceive the costs of taxation in a hypothetical world of perfect economic rationality consistent with neoclassical economics and how taxpayers actually perceive the costs of taxation in the real world." Reasons for tax unawareness are informational transaction costs, the complexity and changeability of tax regulations and the bounded rationality of private investors. Empirical findings show that drawing the attention of individuals to a certain tax increases their tax awareness, hence their responsiveness to this tax (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 2009; Finkelstein, 2009 ). Amending the model by taw awareness variables c  and d  for capital gains taxes and dividend taxes results in
In this model, c  and d  can take values between zero (investor is tax-unaware) and one (investor is fully tax-aware). Following Lang and Shackelford (2000) , the marginal effect of capital gains taxes on share prices can then be described by
In general, free cash flows F are higher than dividends D 1 , and shareholders realize positive capital gains. Thus, the derivative (3) is negative, and higher expected capital gains taxes reduce the share price. However, that holds only for tax-aware investors. If c  approaches zero, we generally obtain 5 Note that the simplifying assumption of constant payments, constant interest rates and constant tax rates can be justified by imperfect foresight of the market participants taking current values as expectations for future values. Similar implications of the modelling would follow if free cash flows were assumed to grow over time (Lang and Shackelford, 2000) .
Hence, investors who entirely lack tax awareness will expectedly not react to capital gains taxation. Note that c  of an individual investor may change suddenly over time. For example, a private investor who has heard about an upcoming tax reform without knowing any detail, would be informed by relatives, friends or his tax accountant and would be strongly advised to care about these issues immediately.
Similar to Dai et al. (2008) , our argument may be extended to a market equilibrium framework. We focus on demand-sided capitalization effects as lock-in effects are not relevant in our empirical setting. 6 Therefore, we take the reservation price of the sellers as fixed and conclude that the supply curve will not be affected by the German capital gains tax reform 2009.
By contrast, interpreting formula (2) as a representation of the equilibrium price from a buyer perspective, it turns out quite clearly that higher capital gains taxation will shift the demand curve and reduce average demand. However, this well-known effect of capital gains taxation will be mediated in our model by the average level of tax awareness in the market. If the number of tax-aware investors is high, capital gains taxes will be capitalized in the equilibrium price as described by Shackelford and Verrechia (2002) and Dai et al. (2008) .
However, if most market participants are tax-unaware, information on capital gains taxation would be initially ignored implying a small impact on the demand curve as well as on trading volumes and equilibrium prices. In such a setting, financial markets might show a delayed reaction on tax reforms resulting from a steadily dissemination of tax information. 7 In case of a strong increase in tax awareness, there might also be an immediate market reaction resulting in significant effects on trading behavior.
An important implication of our argument is that tax-aware investors may use their superior information to increase their trading profits. This can be exemplified by two private investors A and B with different tax awareness levels ( 10  cc AB ;
) in view of an upcoming increase in the capital gains tax rate. We assume further that B will adjust his or her awareness to 1 6 The lock-in effect is valid if the seller will demand for a higher selling price in order to compensate for unexpectedly high capital gains taxes. However, in our setting capital gains taxes were only increased for shares purchased by private investors after January 1, 2009. Therefore, sellers of shares in the relevant period (December 2008) were not affected by unexpectedly high capital gains taxes.
after the increase of the tax rate (at the latest when capital gains are realized and capital gains taxes will have to be paid). As information on the tax law change becomes available, the reservation price of A A P decreases, while B P remains constant. Thus, A could sell shares to B obtaining for the price B P , while B would realize the loss resulting from the higher capital gains tax in future.
Regarding the German capital gains tax reform 2009, we have good reason to believe that the majority of the affected private investors (institutional investors were unaffected) was far from being fully tax-aware. This is underlined by Deutsche Bank (2008) Second, as documented by economic and psychological research, individuals tend to procrastinate actions (Akerlof, 1991; Hammer and Ferrari, 2002) , which is especially an issue for savings behavior (see Thaler and Bernartzi, 2004; Carroll et al., 2009 , with further references). Ferrari and Dovidio (2000) find evidence that "(…) people higher in decisional procrastination are systematic and strategic but search for more information specifically about chosen alternatives." This fits well with our story as the acquisition of shares is a risky task and media discussion in December 2008 provided more information on the capital gains tax reform 2009. In addition, experiments from Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) suggest that selfimposed deadlines of individuals are not as effective as externally-imposed deadlines to overcome procrastination. Hence, the introduction date of the reform (as the final deadline) provided a strong incentive for procrastinators and initially unaware investors.
Regarding the German capital gains tax reform 2009, a rational strategy in order to avoid capital gains taxes was the acquisition of shares before January 1, 2009. Note that shares acquired before that date were not affected by the flat tax on capital gains (even in future periods). While market reactions of well-informed rational taxpayers should have been focused on the announcement dates of the reform (see also Voeller and Müller, 2011) , we further expect a delayed market reaction close to the introduction date resulting from a lack of tax awareness and procrastination of investment behavior. Hence, we hypothesize: 
Identification strategy and data

Identification strategy
A major strategy of the existing literature to identify pricing effects of capital gains taxes relies on a hypothesized differential impact of capital gains taxes on dividend-paying firms and non-dividend paying firms (Amoako-Adu, Rashid, and Stebbins, 1992; Lang and Shackelford, 2000; Dai, Maydew, Shackelford, and Zhang, 2008) . This approach is based on the fact that returns from non-dividend-paying firms are exclusively based on capital gains, while returns from dividend-paying firms also result from dividends. Therefore, if investors capitalize taxes in a rational way, capital gains taxes will have a stronger impact on nondividend-paying firms compared to dividend-paying firms.
An important assumption of this approach is that assets are priced rationally by investors being well-informed about all relevant tax issues. For that reason, this identification strategy does not seem to be feasible for our analysis of "tax-unaware" German investors, because these investors will typically not only be unaware of capital gains taxes as such but also of their differential effects on the returns of dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms.
Taking into account the complexity of the correlation between asset prices, capital gains taxes and dividends, this argument holds even in case of a temporary increase of tax awareness by the end of 2008. 8
As a result, we use an alternative identification strategy relying on comparisons between treated assets and non-treated assets. We interpret the introduction of a flat tax on private capital gains in Germany in January 2009 as a natural experiment, which can be analyzed by difference-in-differences estimation. Considering the well-known home bias of private investors (French and Poterba, 1991; Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock, 2004; Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009 ), we expect that tax changes in Germany will have a stronger impact on assets of the German stock market compared to assets of other major European stock markets. Jochem and Volz (2011) show that German investors hold slightly more than 50 % of their total shares on the German stock market. A potential problem of such an approach might be that the end-of-the-year effect (Starks, Yong, and Zheng, 2006) Using control groups as well as control periods, our estimation strategy may also be denoted as difference-in-differences-in-differences estimation. This approach has a number of advantages 
Data
As data base, we rely on stock market and financial statement information using the DATASTREAM database. While information on asset prices and trading volumes for each stock is available for each trading day, financial statement data is based on business annual reports. As we use data of 60 trading days for each period, stock and stock market, we are provided with 261,900 stock-day observations. 10 We consider information on all officially listed companies in Germany, France and the UK.
This raw data has been adjusted in two ways. First of all, we exclude all observations with missing information on asset prices, trading volumes or control variables. Second, we do not consider observations with negative earnings before interests, taxes, depreciations and amortizations (EBITDA) 11 or a negative price-to-book value (PTBV The main stock exchange in Germany is Frankfurt stock exchange. However, we also consider data from firms listed at other German stock exchanges like Munich or Stuttgart. 10 While stock markets in Germany are closed on Christmas and the New Year's Eve, trading on these days is typically possible in France and the UK. To align our data, we do not consider these trading days from France and the UK. Note that this effect is not only relevant for the year 2008/2009, but also for the preceding and the following observation periods. Thus, it should not bias our regression results. 11 We exclude these observations as a logarithmic specification is not possible for a negative EBITDA.
Descriptive statistics on our major variables of interest (asset price, daily return, trading volume) and our most relevant control variables (market value, book value, EBITDA) are provided by Table 2 . The daily return is measured as the relative change of the actual asset price compared to the last years' asset price in percentage points. The trading volume is the number of trades of a given share per day. The book value has been calculated as the asset price divided by the price-to-book-ratio und multiplied with the number of shares. EBITDA are the current year earnings before interests, taxes, depreciations and amortizations. Asset price, market value, book value and EBITDA are reported in local currency (€ in Germany and France and British pounds in the UK).
[ Table 2 about here] Table 2 reveals that the average stock of the German market has a somewhat smaller market value and book value compared to France and the UK. In addition, average asset prices per stock are lower. The mean daily returns in all three stock markets are very small and statistically not different from zero. The average number of trades per day (trading volume) is higher in the UK and somewhat smaller in France, while average EBITDA is very similar in all three markets. In order to account for differences between stock markets, we consider stock fixed effects as well as stock market-year fixed effects in our regression analysis.
Empirical results
Graphical analysis
For our graphical analysis, we derive estimates for abnormal asset prices, abnormal returns and abnormal trading volumes using the following regression model:
As dependent variables Y it , we use the logarithm of trading volume (measured by 1,000 trades per day), the logarithm of the asset price in local currency (€ or British pound) and the relative change of asset prices for each trading day (daily return). Regarding trading volume and asset price, we choose a logarithmic specification to obtain a relative measure for trading and pricing effects and to ensure the linearity in variables.
Our vector of controls C it accounts for the logarithm of market value, the logarithm of book value and the logarithm of EBITDA (all measured in millions of local currency). Regarding the market value, we do not account for changes within a given observation period (30 trading days before and after the end of a given year). Thus, we exclusively use the corresponding value of the first observation for each period. This is to avoid endogeneity, as the market value might be driven by the asset price and not vice versa. We use realized EBITDA of the following period (e.g. EBITDA 2009 for the turn-of-the-year 2008/2009) as a proxy for the expected development of profits of listed companies. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of our dependent and exogenous variables.
[ In Figure 2 to Figure 4 [ Figure 3 about here]
Regarding abnormal daily returns (Figure 3) , we do not find significant deviations between treatment group and control group apart from the week before and the week after the introduction of the German flat tax on capital gains. In line with our expectations, abnormal returns of the treatment group are higher before and lower after the introduction of the capital gains tax. Therefore, the introduction of the German capital gains should have resulted in a temporary increase in the demand for shares as well as in a temporary increase in asset prices. 
Regression analysis
As reported by subsection 4.1., we interpret stock-day observations of the German stock market at the end-of-the-year 2008/2009 as treatment group and corresponding observations in France and the UK as control group to identify the impact of the German capital gains tax reform on trading volumes, asset prices and daily returns by difference-in-differences estimation. In addition, we use observations in corresponding reference periods in 2006/2007, 2007/2008, 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 to control for structural differences in stock markets and end-of-the-year effects. Furthermore, we account for the same control variables as in our graphical analysis in section 5.1. This results in the following regression model with the dependent variables Y it logarithm of trading volume, logarithm of asset price and daily return in percentage points: 
In this model, Before is a dummy variable with a value of one in a certain time window before the turn-of-the-year (otherwise zero). In line with our graphical evidence, we choose one
week as standard reference period. This implies that the main effect of the German capital gains tax on trading volumes and asset prices can be observed one week (five trading days) before its introduction by the turn-of-the-year 2008/2009. However, we also test alternative reference periods (two days corresponding to our hypotheses 3a to 3c and two weeks).
Before Germany and Before 0809 are time dummies controlling for structural differences of Before DiD, which is an interaction term of Before, a dummy variable for Germany and the year dummy for 2008/2009. In line with our hypotheses, we expect that Before DiD is positively correlated to asset prices, daily returns and trading volumes.
Similar to Before, After is a dummy variable with a value of one in a certain reference period after the turn of a given year. After Germany, After 0809 and After DiD are calculated in the same way as the corresponding interaction terms of our Before dummy. Corresponding to our hypotheses, we expect a positive correlation of After DiD with the asset price and a negative correlation of After DiD with daily returns and trading volumes.
The control variables conform to our regression model (6). We estimate a simplified model including a limited set of controls (stock market-year fixed effects and stock fixed effects) and
an extended model further including industry-year fixed effects as well as Market value, Book value and EBITDA (all measured by the logarithm of the corresponding values in millions of local currency). The estimation has been executed by OLS. We use robust standard errors being clustered for each share to account for heteroscedasticity and the correlation of standard errors over time.
The regression results for the standard reference period of one week (five trading days) are reported by Table 4 . In the models for daily returns, the regression coefficients of the dummy can be interpreted as a change in the daily return in percentage points. In the logarithmic models for asset prices or trading volumes, our results are to be interpreted as semielasticities. Note that in this case the estimated dummy variable coefficients have to be recalculated in order to obtain the relative effect on the dependent variable. As shown by Kennedy (1981) , the relative change can be approximated by [ Table 4 about here]
The regression results for our primary variables of interest (Before DiD and After DiD) confirm our theoretical expectations. For our interpretation we focus on the extended models with a higher number of control variables. Confirming Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2a, the average daily trading volume of the German stock market in 2008/2009 was unexectedly about 122 % higher before the introduction of the tax (Before DiD) and about 11 % lower thereafter (After DiD). Hence, trading volume seems to have been shifted up-front from January 2009 to December 2008. Regarding asset price, we find an about 3.2 % to 3.3 % higher price level one week before and one week after the introduction date, which confirms the hypotheses 1b and 2b. In line with the hypotheses 1c and 2c, we find on average an about 2.1 percentage points higher (1.3 percentage points lower) abnormal daily return before (after) the introduction of the tax. Addressing the hypotheses 3a to 3c, we estimate regressions with an alternative reference period of two trading days before and after the turn-of-the-year. The results are reported by Table 5 .
[ Table 5 about here]
The results confirm our expectations. For the extended models with the higher number of control variables, we find an about 6.3 % higher average price level before the introduction date and a still 4.7 % higher price level thereafter. The abnormal daily return is 2.1 percentage points before the turn-of-the-year 2008/2009 and minus 1.7 percentage points after the tax reform. The trading volume in the two last German trading days in 2008 was about 151 % higher than the "normal" volume (Before DiD). However and contrasting our expectations, we do not find a significant decrease in the trading volume in the two days after the introduction date. Thus, the pull-forward effect of the capital gains tax rather affected trades at the end of the first trading week 2009.
While Table 5 shows an especially strong increase of the price level and the trading volume within the last days in 2008, it cannot be taken as evidence that corresponding estimates are statistically different from the estimates in Table 4 . Therefore, we re-estimate the model including all variables from both regressions. Results are provided by Table 6 .
[ Table 6 about here]
As documented by our results on Before DiD and After DiD for two days (2D) as well as
Before DiD and After DiD for one trading week (1W), we find evidence that higher trading volumes and price levels were especially focused on the last trading days between Christmas and New Year's Eve 2008. However, we do not find a significant difference for daily returns.
For the two days after the turn-of-the-year 2008/2009 we obtain higher abnormal asset prices and lower daily returns. By contrast, combining our estimates for After DiD (2D) and After DiD (1W), there is only a significantly lower trading volume in the last three trading days of the first trading week in January 2009. Thus, trading volume seems to have needed some time to drop from an abnormally high level to an abnormally low level.
The results of Table 6 clearly confirm our expectations and hypotheses. They also provide us with a more detailed estimate on market reactions due to the capital gains tax reform 2008/2009. Combining the estimates on all relevant variables and focusing on the models with a higher number of controls, the abnormal increase in asset prices (trading volumes) was 2.0 % (104 %) in the first three days of the last week 2008 and 7.4 % (160 %) in the last two trading days in 2008. The maximum increase in the price level can be calculated by the abnormal daily returns of about 2 percentage points in the last week. Therefore, prices increased on average by 10.3 % during the last week.
Cross checks
We calculated a number of cross checks to control for the robustness of our regression results.
First of all, we controlled for alternative identification periods of market reactions (e.g. two weeks). In line with our graphical evidence, we did not find strong market reactions for the second last week of the year. Second, we increased the length of our observation period (identification period plus control period) for our investigation to 60 trading days before and after the turn-of-each year 2008/2009 (altogether 120 trading days). Corresponding results do not differ significantly from our basic analysis. Third, we increased the number of control periods from two (2007/2008 and 2009/2010) to four (2006/2007, 2007/2008, 2009/2010, 2010/2011) in order to find out if our results are driven by events of our reference periods.
Again, results correspond to our basic analysis. Exchange or Madrid Stock Exchange). These regressions do also confirm our basic analysis.
Conclusion
In this paper we address the question, if and how tax awareness and procrastination behavior may affect the impact of capital gains taxation on trading volumes and asset prices. We extend existing theoretical research on asset pricing by evidence on tax awareness and procrastination and hypothesize that not only the announcement date of a new tax will affect trading volume and asset pricing, but also its introduction date if this is related to tax awareness.
To address these issues empirically, we analyze the Before (2D) 0.0188*** 0.0189*** 0.00640*** 0.00640*** -0.744*** -0.744*** (0.00161) (0.00145) (0.000407) (0.000406) (0.0231) (0.0231) Before Germany (2D) 0.00884** 0.00912*** -0.00274*** -0.00275*** 0.386*** 0.386*** (0.00368) (0.00313) (0.000846) (0.000846) (0.0416) (0.0416) Before 0809 (2D) -0.0218*** -0.0220*** 0.00545*** 0.00545*** 0.123*** 0.123*** (0.00440) (0.00422) (0.00122) (0.00122) (0.0352) (0.0351) Before DiD ( Within R 2 0.490 0.727 0.00929 0.00991 0.0639 0.0665 Overall R 2 0.0439 0.399 0.00934 0.00275 0.00661 0.407 Dependent variables: logarithm of asset price, daily return (in percentage points) and logarithm of trading volume (in thousands). Estimates are calculated by OLS with stock fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered on the asset level and documented in parentheses; *** / ** / * indicate statistical significance on the 1 % / 5 % / 10 % level. Before (2D) 0.0101*** 0.0105*** 0.00121** 0.00121** -0.669*** -0.669*** (0.00100) (0.000915) (0.000593) (0.000592) (0.0244) (0.0244) Before Germany (2D) -0.00431 -0.00534** -0.00113 -0.00114 0.577*** 0.577*** (0.00337) (0.00241) (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.0417) (0.0417) Before 0809 (2D) 0.00603** 0.00556** 0.0147*** 0.0147*** -0.0366 -0.0365 (0.00279) (0.00245) (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.0374) (0.0374) Before DiD (2D) 0.0518*** 0.0513*** 0.00210 0.00212 0.244*** 0.243*** (0.00651) (0.00558) (0.00322) (0.00322) (0.0619) (0.0620) After (2D) 0.00967*** 0.0100*** 0.00582*** 0.00582*** -0.208*** -0.207*** (0.00110) (0.000991) (0.000580) (0.000581) (0.0210) (0.0209) After Germany (2D) -0.00544* -0.00673*** 0.000771 0.000766 0.0758** 0.0753** (0.00315) (0.00231) (0.00135) (0.00135) (0.0358) (0.0358) After 0809 ( 0.0435 0.398 0.0113 0.00364 0.00707 0.405 Dependent variables: logarithm of asset price, daily return (in percentage points) and logarithm of trading volume (in thousands). Estimates are calculated by OLS with stock fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered on the asset level and documented in parentheses; *** / ** / * indicate statistical significance on the 1 % / 5 % / 10 % level. 
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